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Case No.

vs.

\V. C. PATERSON, ASA LLOYD
HEFLIN, MEL ':--IN C. BOWLES,
FIRST DOE, SECO·ND DOE,
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Defendants 01nd, App,ella.n ts.
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DONALD T. ADAMS,
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STATEMENT O·F F ACT·S
The statement of facts in the brief of defendant and
appallent omits facts having a material bearing on the
cause, and particularly in connection with what constitutes the gravamen of the action. The att~ention of
the Court is invited to the fact that after the defendant
and appellant, W. C. P·aterson, and plaintiff arid respon-
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dent, N. B. Rogers (Helman), had undertaken to P'rocure mining claims in ·Colorado (Tr. 5, 22), they pro~ured two groups of mining claims in Utah (Tr. 6).
These two latter mentioned groups are referred to in
the testimony as ~h.e ''Eleven claims'' and the ''Yellow
Circle Claims.'' Such mining claims were to be acquired
jointly (i.e. one-half in the name of each of the respondent and app~ellant ( Tr. 5, 7, 9, 33, Ex. 1, 25), and half
of the interest in· the claims was to be reserved for
persons assisting in the financing of the venture, and the
other half was to be held by appellant and respondent
after certain expens·es (Tr. 22, 25, 78) were adjusted,
after which and ultimately a corporation to he formed
was to take o~er the ground ( Tr. 5, 24, 30, Ex. 3, 4, 6,
10, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23), and those supplying the
financing were to take half the stock (Tr. 78). The
company to he formed was to he known as the Ar.cana
Development ·Company, and, after certain eXlpenses, respondent and app-ellant were to divide the other half of
the corporation's stock (Tr. 78). The title to the Yellow
Circle group of mining claims, purchased by contract
dated June 1, 1948 (Ex. C) was taken in the joint names
of respondent and appellant, in accordance with their
understanding as to holding titles ('Tr. 73, 74, Ex. 29).
Later, the appellant Paterson p.rocured from the respondent Rogers a blank signed deed or deeds, ostensibly
for the purpose of .enabling the ap:pellant Paterson to
furnish a deed if a contemplated sale .concerning the
group of "Eleven" claims was made (Tr. 16, 17, 45,
Ex. 20, 21). No sale ·of the so-called ' 'Eleven'' claims

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

being consununated, appellant filled in the deed signed
by respondent Rogers with his own name as grantee,
added the description of the ''Yellow Circle" claims,
and had the deed recorded ( Tr. 42, 43, 45, Ex. 29). No
consent or permission '""as procured from the respondent Rogers to so use the deed, which effected the transfer of her half interest in the legal title to the "Yellow
Circle Claims'' to appellant p·aterson (Tr. 17, 18, 67,
76). Learning of the recording of this deed, respondent
instituted this action to protect her interest by having
the deed set ·aside or annulled, and having her legal title
to a half interest in the ''Yellow Circle'' group quieted
against appellant PaterS'on, in order to preserve the
pre-existing arrangement (Tr. 12, 18, 20, Rec. 37-58).
Judgment was rendered in respondent's favor, quieting
title to a half-interest in the claims in h·er favor ( Tr.
81-83, Rec. 14-19). From this judgment and decree and
the court's denial of a motion to modify the findings,
conclusions, and decree (Rec. 20, 21, 10, 8) def.endant
Paterson appeals on the grounds set forth commencing
at page 6 of app-ellant's brief.
There is testimony that respondent Rogers raised
$40,000.00 approximately to assist in the acquisition of
these various claims (Tr. 19, 26), and appellant contends
(Tr. 40, 57) that the major portion of the money raised
was used on the other p·rop·erties, leaving him to pay the
larger !portion of the amounts due on the ''Yellow Circle''
group's purchase price. On page 6 of appellant's brief,
counsel sets out figures for the purpose of showing that
payments on the "Yello\v Circle" group amounted to,
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and were apportionable as there mentioned, and asserts
that such testimony was uncontradicted. The latter
assump,tion is erroneous. The given figur·es were neither
contradicte·d or gone into (1) Because the ·Court indicated he wa:s not allowing an a,ccounting in the instant
action (Tr. 42), (2) Ap·pellant's own counsel asserted in
the proceedings that the matter was only a "simple"
suit to quiet title (Tr. 12), (3) Because as shown very
clearly by the record Exhibit "B~", from which some of
the figures quoted in a'ppellan t 's brief are taken, was
NEVER AD·MITTED (Tr. 27), and the use of Exhibit
qG'', another statement, was LIMITED as shown in the
discussion concerning its ·admissibility, to the purpose
of p·roving an understanding was had by these parties
iat a meeting in Kansas City, and NO·T F:OR. AL·L
PURP,OSES, or for the figures therein, as counsel for
appellant so blandly assume, and would have the Court
believe (Tr. 65, 66). Exhibit "H", another statem~ent,
insofar as the record covers the matter, does not appear
to have been anywhere off.ered or received ( Tr. 6.6 et seq)
as such. Respondent asks the Court to bear in mind that
the figures set out are only as appellant contends them
to lbe, and, that the p·roffered exhibits from which they
were purportedly quoted, are either not in evidence, or
the ·admission of same was for a limited purpose, not
concerned with the itemization of the figures ap!pearing.
It is also a matter set out in the evidence that any
accounting or settlement was to be had as between these
l,itig~nts in connection with their dealings when the
prop·erties were turned over to the corporation, which
time, at the trial of this cause below, had apparently
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not yet arrived (Tr. 20, 25, 28). This general statement
is made to correct impressions that may have arisen from
appellant's statement of facts, and, further facts will be
mentioned in presentation of the arguments herein.

ARG U~'[ EN T

R.ESPONDENT'S POINT I.-NO INCOMPL·ETE
DECREE WAS ENTERED.
A WRONGDOER NOT ENTITLED TO· AID
OF EQIDTY COURT.
(a)

It is a cardinal doctrine of equity jurisprudence that
parties do not come into the equity court as of right,
but, only if the court in consideration of all the circumstances will p·ermit. The court may have power to h·ear
nr determine certain actions, yet decline to do so where
the circumstances justify, as shown in:

Equ.ity - Section 9, Distinction Betw-een
Power and Jurisdict~ovn:
"There is a clear distinction between the
term 'jurisdiction' in its strict meaning ·and as
generally used in equity jurisprudence. Technically, jurisdiction is the power to hear and
deterrnine the subject matter in controversy between the parties to a suit, and jurisdiction as
thus defined does not mean simply jurisdiction
of a particular case, hut jurisdiction of the class
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of._ cases to which the particular ca.se b-elongs, or
as sometimes stated, power residing in the Court
to hear -·and determine an action. It is common,
1

howe.ver,:_t;o spook of jwrisdic;t.ion.in equity o-r the.
jurisdiction of .Ia Gourt of equtity a$ not relating
to t.he pow·er of the oourt to hear ood dletermine
~a oaru;se, but as relatilng to whether it ought to
assume the jurisdiction, ~wnd hear ~and decide the
caus-e, ~ovr as:~·re..latiwg._ .t-o. t.he_ cases or ocCJas~ons
wh.ern the p~ow·er ·to he1ar and determine will be
exercised. THJ.S DlSTJN(}TION IS IMPORTANT .AND SHOULD NOT BE LOST SIGHT

. , .9.F. ~'-.·.30,Q.J ..S., :eages ~2~~328._

--.

Ap~pellant

cites numerous cases wherein relief was
enlarged, or where on appeal the appellate courts held
the measure of relief (even to an adversary p·arty:) was
incomplete or insufficient (P'ages 8-9, Appellant's Brief).
Perusal of such cas~es indicates that for the most 'part
they are based· on the doctrine that he who comes into
equity m~st do equity, and the appellate courts found
that.. the trial courts had not required the party s~eeking
relief in all respects to do equity~ For example, in
Stromerson vs. Averill, 121 P. 2d 826; 126 P. 2d 392;
141 P. 2d 732, 133 P. 2d 617, it was held in various
appeals that, as in,ci,de~tal to. hoJding a~ ~gent taking
lands of his princip~al in his .-own name (Le. the agent's)
held,~ them~ for ,t}l~ p·rincip~~l, t4at contracts, crop contr.-acts, c.hat~el mortgages, and other obligations in the
:ag~n~'s· -~a~e alone, and on which he was therefor personally bound to third _p-arties, must b~, when the prin!cip~J took over, assumed by the princip,al, and suitable
provision- or indemnity made for procuring the -agent's
·release· ·from future liability thereon. Biacon vs. Wahrhaftig, 218 P. 2d 144, holds that in a statutory partition
-
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action, that all parti·es named 1n the statute must be
joined to 1nake a d~ree, and that it was the duty of the
court to so order. LaJolla Oasa Demanarn.a vs. Hopkins,
219 P. 2d 871, holds that where a seller had reserved
the right of use of a house on the property sold, for the
duration of the war and had wrongfully held over (as
deter1nined in the action), that as incidental to the :termination of the rights of user, the court would retain
jurisdiction to assess damages. Floor vs. Johnson, 199
P. 2d 347, provides another example of granting incidental telief by holding after the cancellation of shares
of stock in a corporation, that directors elected on basis
of votes excluding the can,celled shares would be· seated.
Ludlow vs. Ca~o·rado Animal By-Products Co., 137 P.
2d 347, and Kivnsmaw vs. Utah Gas & Coke Q1o., 177 p·.
419, hold that incidental relief in the way of damages
will be assessed in a cause brought to restrain a nuisance,
hut where injunctive relief would not be granted due to
delays-in bringing the suit.
But, appellant .ove;rlooks t.he fact tha.t in all t.hese
cases that the party se.eking ·affirmative relief was wot
·a WRONGD·OER himself, or, that it W'as equit·able t:o
require a party w·ho w'as seeking relief to p•er~o1rm som.e
condition rprreced.ent as .a con.dit~on of relief, not to aid
the w·rongdoer, but t;o prevent wnd!ue ad(l}arntage or enrichment of the party seeking relief. IN NO INSTAN'CE
WAS RELIEF PREDICATED ON THE. WRONGDOER'S RIGHT TO HAVE THE INTER.PO,SITION
OF THE EQUITY COURT. See:
Sect~on 401, Ma.xim as to :CleOJn) Ha;nd.s,F.raud.
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''Another familiar illustration of the principle may he found in all cases wh·ere the plaintiff's claim is affected by his own fraud * * *
The maxim is mor·e frequently invoked in cases
upon fraudulent contract.

* * * *
'' On.e who w·rongfully ·approp~r~a.tes p1101perty
of an.ot:he:r for his iOWn use will not receive the
,aid of .a covurt of equity in ·aWJJ matte.r with which
such rep,rehensible oondruct is conne!cted1. A. court
of equity will not 1aid 1one who, standing in a
reZat·ion '0 f confidenc·e 'tiOI arno ther commits acts
in vio~ation of his .trust w~hich .are imm.edia.tely
connected with the subject mntter of the litiga,..
tion." 2 Pomeroy's Equity ,Jurisprudence (5th
Edition, Symons) Page 104.

IT IS APPROP'RI.ATE TO· REMIND T'HE
C·OURT, at this point, that the appellant Paterson, who
seeks to invoke the aid of an equity court for an ~ccount
ing, and other relief, is the WRONGDOER. He misused
the deed, he put the title in his own name, he filled in
the blanks in the deed to cover 1property which the instrum~ent was not intended to cover. Appellant's elaims for
relief do not, therefore, commend themselves to a court
of equity, and it was eminently proper for the trial court
to limit the· issues to the qui~eting of the title to the half
interest (defendant and appellant's title to the other
half of the ground has not been di~turhed or affected
by these proceedings), and, no incomplete relief exists.
While actual fraud on appellant's part was not found
by the court, still a misuse of the deed was the basis of
annulling it and quieting title to the half interest of
respondent. Even fraud is not the sole ground for denying equitable relief, other misconduct may bar a re1nedy.
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In Co'U11nonwealth Finance C1ompany vs. McH~ar!J,
1922, 282 Fed. 560, the circuit court of appeals enunciates the whole rule, while applying it in a fraud case,
as follo,vs :
Page 569: ~'To call into action the 'processes
of a court of equity, the right asserted, must
appeal to the conscience 1of the chancellor. In
DeWeese vs. Reinhard, (165 U.S. 386, 390, 17
Sup. Ct. 340, 341, -±1 La\v Ed. 757), it was stated,
·A. court l()f equity acts only W'hen and as conscience
com1'Ylands, and if the condu~ct of the plaintiff
be offewsive to the dictates of natural justice, * * *
he will be held remediless in a court 101f equity.'
A.nd, in such case, w-e think the defenda;n)t who
asks affirmativ·e relief, is in no better position
thwn is a plaintiff.''
Coercion as a ground of wrongdoing has been h·eld
to preclude relief, in the case of Phez VB. Salem Fruit
Co., 1925, 233 Pac. 547, 133 Ore. 398, where the court
says:
Page 556 : '' ( 5) This (situation) is shown
by testimony upon the trial between plaintiff and
the growers. A court of equity should leave the
growers and the Northwest Company and its
assignee in the same place they were when the
company attempted by using and coercing the
union to overreach the growers and obtain an
unfair contract by the means indicated.''
Again, in relation to accountings, in 1 American
Jurisprudence, Page 303, Section 56, Accounts, and
Accounting, we find the rule:

'' * * * ·One may, by his misconduct be pr~e
cluded fron1 the right to an accounting in equity
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by virtue of the requirement that the complainant
must come into ·Court with clean hands * * *."
Indeed, in Hultz vs. Taylor, 181 Pac. 2d, 515, one
of the very cases relied upon by ruppellant, who was in
this instance a wrongdoer, we find this statement:
Page 520: " ( 3, 4) But in any caS'e wherein
the court has equity jurisdiction, the relief prayed
fo.r by the p1arties is not ~a controlling factor. The
prayer of 1a petition or a cross-petition is not a
part of the stat.ement of the cause of actvow. The
purpose which the prayer serves is to indicate
the relief to which the pleader may think he is
entitled. See Eberhart Lumber Company vs.
Lecuyer, 153 Kan. 386, 389, 110 Pac. 757. Paragraph 2 of the syllabus of the last cited case reads
as follows: "A trial cou.rt sitting as ·a court of
equity is not obli.ged vo render the specific decree
prayed: for, but m.a.y render a ·decree in a~ccordarnce
with its own judgment or discretion a.s to what
just~ce dema;nd.s in view of t.he "acts 1Jleaded and
the evidence ~adduced.' ''
In Richman vs. Ba;nk of Perris, 1929, 282 Pae. 2d
801 (California), the court cites with approval at page
807, the cas·e of Allste1ad vs. L(l!Umeister, 16 Cal. App.
59, 116 P'ac. 296, 297, which latter case quotes with approval the rule from Pomeroy, already above eited
herein as 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th Edition, Symons) Page 104.
The general equitable rule has been reeognized in
Utah: See Jones Min.ing Co. vs. C·ardiff Mining & Milling Co., 191 Pac. 426, 56· Utah 449 (1920), where the
court says at page 434:
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H

* • * and "'"hile I unhesitatingly assert that

a court of equity should not permit a wrongdoer
to profit by his "'"rong, * * * ''
The court in its sound discretion was not bound
to permit an aceounting, or to ·enlarge the issues of the
case, and, having the rig·ht, as. ·a matter of oonscien·ce,
to decline to aid appellant Paterson, no compJaint for
incompleteness of the decree can be made, if appellant
\\'"a.sn 't entitled to any decree at all. It is p·erfectly clear
from the evidence that these two 'parties each had legal
title to an lmdivided half interest in the "Yellow Circle"
group. '\VhateYer other equities or rights existed between
them, the ·Court by annulling the deed which the app·ellant Paterson filled out wrongfully and r·ecorded, and
which deed transferred respondent Roger's (Helman's)
interest to him in violation of the relationship· existing,
has merely put them in the same relative position as they
were before the wrongful use of the deed. Appellant,
\vho wrongfully caused the changed status, cannot complain if- the court reinstates the original status, he has
no grounds for cognizance in the forum of equity.

(b)

DELINEATION OF INTEREST UNNEC-

ESS.A.RY TO A C011:PL·ETE DECREE.

It n1ay well be that in the absence of predetermined
agreement, that a court would adjudge joint purchasers
of a com1non tract to hold title in proportion to their
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respective interests, but, where 'the: interests, were by
the ~agreements, understandings, and conduct of the
parties such, that each was to hold legal title to a half
interest, the trial Court, or any other Court, would have
no grounds for substituting a diff·erent basis of ownership than that agreed on, anything else would constitute
a rewriting of the existing contract and understanding
for the tparties otherwise than in accordance with their
right of contract. No contention is made, nr has ever
been made by the respondent, insofar as the :vecord
shows, that her proper portion of the cost of the Yell ow
Circle claims should not in due time, and in accordance
with the understandings of the parties, he paid, IF SHE
ACTUALLY O·WES ANY BALANCE. Assuming, without conceding that the law respecting co-owners is correct as set out in appellant's brief, the court is still confronted with the fact that whatever may be the pr·esent
p·roportion of r·espondent's contributinn to the purchase
price of the ''Yell ow ·Circle'' it would not be proper
to ~pportion the '' Y·ellow Circle'' Jlaims on the basis
of contributions made to those claims alone, when; the
state of •accounts between the parties over the whole
period of dealings might mak·e the appellant's proportion
smaller, or even non-existent. As me!ltioned in the statement of facts, the full facts and figures concerning the
overall amounts of payments on all the properties of
these participants, is not before this Court, nor was it
before the trial court, and to try to piecemeal the accounting by affording the ap·p·ellant a lien against the ''Yellow
Circle'' group, when 'by reason of the situatinn existing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
in the larger scope of the parties' o:perations the lien
n1ight be s1naller, or non-existent, due· to other offsets
would be unfair. Furtherrno~e, whether the caus-e and
court below· """ould be a proper forum to determine all the
inter-related questions bet,veen the parties is most questionable, since there is realty in Colorado involved,
questions relating to the rights of in¥estors involved,
rights of the Arcana Development C'Ompany, who might
all be proper parties, and, the need might exist for evidence and \Vi tnesses from ·Colorado, Kans-as, or elsewhere. Note also, that appellant did not seek to interplead any other defendants, nor did he confess his
wrongdoing, and seek to have a general accounting, or
anything like that~uite the contrary, in the p·rayer to
appellants' answer and cross-complaint, the relief s!pecifically sought was to have respondent's title decZared
invalid, and the title to the i,nterest ·in quest'iJorn quiete:d
in appellant. Certainly, that w-asn't coming in on the
theory of doing equity, quit.e the cont.ra.ry! Lastly, it
does not appear from the testimony in the record that
any accounting is required in court-for the parties indicated they had the neeessary records to make adjustmen~s between themselves, ·and there 'vas nothing to indicate that the accounting could not and would not be
Inade, when the time set for the same arrived, at the
ti1ne of turning over the p.roperties to the corporation
and adjusting the state of accounts. An inspection of
the proffered exhibits, for the purported partial account
on the '' Y.ellovv Circle'' claims, sho\VS that some items
are esti1nates, others are totals, and not itemized, \vhich
makes it im·practical to deal in ultimate totals without
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better support. Since ·Courts of Equity do not require
parties to do us·eless things, or to spend money in court
adducing items 'Of account which could be, to all intents
and purposes, determined between them otherwise, the
Court below, was manifestly right in leaving them to
work the matter out, without trying to impose liens, or
delineate interests, or the like.
The question of res judicata us hereinafter argued
in point II of this brief will be discussed at length therein, and is mentioned at this point to show that it has not
been omitted from consideration. Since as argu·ed in
subdivision (a) of this point I, the decree was not incomplete for failure to provide for complete relief when
app,ellant was not entitled to any relief, and as in subdivision (b) that no delineation of interest or impressment of a lien was pro!per, it was not error for the court
to, in view of all the circumstances, to refuse to modify,
amend, or recast the findings, conclusions, and judgment,
particularly since on the basis even of the proposed
evidence of iappellant, no prop·er halan:ces could be struck
at this time.

RESPONDEN:T'S P,OINT II: INS,TANT DECREE NO·T RES JUDICATA TO· AC·C.OUNTING.
Since the record of the trial and the transcript prepared for this appeal clearly shows the· fact that an
accounting between the parties was not allowed or had
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in this action, it would not, as ~appellant contends, operate to bar him on that point iri a subsequent proceeding,
if such should ever be necessary, since no such issue
was tendered, tried, and- passed' on in this trial. See :

_

Section 181-Mait'ers R.aise:fl, bwt Ign,ored or
Withdra~rn in Preri.ous Action.
''As far as subsequent p-roceedings under a
differ·ent cause of ·acti·on are concerned, the doctrine of res judicata is held not to apply to an
issue raised in the previous cause which was not
passed on by the court or jury in deciding it.
Thus an issue raised by the pleadings which is
withdrawn befor.e trial does not operate as res
judicata.'' * * * 30 Ameriean Juris prudence, Page
927.
Section 174-Test of Tden.tity of !Causes of
Action. In the application of .the doctrin~ of res
judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action
is for the same cause of action as the first, the
test generally applied is to consider the identity
· of facts essential to th·eir mainten,ance, or whether
the same facts would sustain both. * * * If, how·ever, the two actions arise upon different sets of
facts, or different ·p·roofs would be ,required to
.su~tain the two actions, a judgment in _ one is n9
bar t~J judgillent 'in the other. It lias 1Jeen sa,id
that this ·method is ike b~est '.aJnd mos't co~rrect test,
as to whether a fo'rmer judgment is ~a ba,r in subseqi.lent proceedings between the same ·parties,
and it has even been designated ,as infallible."
30 American J uris~prudence, 918.
Section 180-Judgments-D·ifferent Causes
of Act~on. The rule granting eonclusiveness to a
judgment in regard to issues of fact which could
properly have be-en determined in the action is
limited to cases involving the same cause of
action. \Vhere a second cause of action is upon
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a different claim, demand, or cause of action the
est:~blished rule is that the judgment in the first
action operates 'as an estoppel only as to the
points or questions .ACTUALL.Y LITIGATED·
AND DE·TERMINED, and N·OT AS TO MAT'TERS NOT LITIGATED IN THE FORMER
ACTION, EVEN THO·UGH SUCH MATTERS
MIGHT PR:OPERLY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED THEREIN.''-30 American Jurisprudence 925.
It has be-en held that in a quiet title action the
Court only:

' ' * * * determines in such action * * * that
the pl}evailing party has a title superior to, or
good as against that established by his adversary.
All that we de-cide, or that we could decide, is
that plaintiff has established a title or right * * *
superior to, or good as against the title or claim
the defendant asserted or could assert.' '-Hammond vs. Jnhnson, 75 Pacific 2d 164, 94 Utah 35
(1938).
·So -that the ordinary quiet title action respecting this
half interest in the ''Yell ow Cir;cle'' group, could not,
and would not ·operate as a bar to any pro'per accounting
between the· parties, now or in the future. This is further
strengthened by the statement of the rule to be followed
~as laid down in Glen Allen MiwitnJg Co. vs. p,ark Galena
Mining Co., 296 Pacific 232, 77 Utah 362 :
Page 234: ''No issue was offered between
Anderson and Glen Allen Mining Company when
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the Inotion was heard, and Anderson was not
served with notice that such a question would be
litigated. The trial court recognized these conditions when it detern1ined the motion to vacate
and set aside the s·ale, and refused to det·ermine
the question of trust relationship·, and limited the
judgn1ent to a denial of the motion to s·et aside
the sale. Under these conditions, Anderson ought
not to be oound by any judgment upon that question, and it follows as a matter of course that
the Glen Allen ~lining ·Company could not be
bound (as a t·aker through Anderson).''
Appellant claims (Appellant's Brief, page 26) that
an alleged transf·er of respondent's interest has been
"recorded to his prejudice. Although this matter is dehors
the reeord, respondent wishes to point out that such
transfer is to a trustee or in connection with th.e organization of the Arcana Development Company, and can
in no-,vise adversely affect appellant.
It is submitted that the decree of the trial court as
rendered, and the trial proceedings themselves, will
not be such as to preclude the ap·pellant with respect
to any matter of accounting with these or the other
mining claims involved in the dealings between these
two parties. It follows, of course, that with no bar to
a future accounting, the instant decree does not op·erate
as res judicata, and could not have the effe·cts claimed
by appellant.
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RESPO.·NDENT 'S POINT' III: IMMATERIAL
FIND·ING NOT ERROR.
Respeeting app,ellant's second assignment of error,
relating to ·an objection that the Court's Findings of
Fact should not have i~cluded a finding that t~e appellant had agreed to transfer his interest in said mining
claims to a co:rjporation to be thereafter organized, in
the exact language as set out in page 8 of Appellant's
Brief, it is deemed sufficient to refer the Court to S~ec
tion 1787, :Title, AJppe~ & Error, P~age 1192, 5 Corpus
Juris Secundum, where the following ap·pears:
''R.ev;ersible error cannot be found in the
mere fact that a court makes superfluous and unnecessary findings.
''A judgment sup·ported by proper findings
is not vitiated by findings on immaterial points
or issues, for example, on issues outside the pleadings, or unsup!ported by evidence, * * * ''

CONCLlTSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the deci·sion, findings, judgment, and de~cree of the trial court
is and was correct, proper, and in accordance with law
in all respects, that appellant has not sustained the
burden of showing any error, nor does any error appear
warranting the reversal of, or modification of the judg-
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nlent, and, that the same should be affirmed, on app·eal,

with costs to the respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD T. ADAMS,
Monticello, Utah,
R.

:s.

JOHNSON,

207 Atla.s Building,
Salt Lake City 1, Utah,

Attorneys for Plaimtiff
and Responden,t.
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